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linked to the presence of registered
nurses.3 Contemporaneously, the litera-
ture is replete with percentage estimates
of the amount of time nurses spend on
low level basic tasks. It is believed that
increasing the number of health care
assistants would free nurses up to spend
more time in direct patient care with the
concomitant improvements in quality
and safety. It is ironic therefore that,
due to inducting, training and super-
vising the increasing number of health
care assistants, the role that has been
introduced to free up nursing time is
actually consuming nursing time.
The junior doctors’ hours initiative
and the European Working Time
Directive mean that nurses are being
asked to take on roles that were once
the remit of doctors. Wanless4 also
recognised that workload might be
shifted from doctors to nurses, and from
nurses to health care assistants. This
‘‘role drift’’ is not new and not unique to
nursing; allied health professionals,
pharmacists and dentists are delegating
what were previous core duties to
assistants or technicians. Unfortunately
‘‘role drift’’ often occurs in an ad hoc
fashion and may exceed its original
scope.
Health care assistants undertake a
number of duties previously carried out
by nurses. A sample from a very long list
includes catheter care, wound dressing,
venepuncture, formulating patient care
plans, setting up and monitoring diag-
nostic machines, setting up infusion
feeds, giving injections, taking charge
of shifts, monitoring use of cardiotoco-
graph machines, providing advice on
parenting skills and breast feeding.
According to the literature, much of this
work is unsupervised. Because of their
increasing numbers (estimated to be
over half a million in the UK), and
hence visibility in the clinical setting,
health care assistants are also involved
more in student learning.
Despite the fact that they are at the
front line in providing care, there is no
statutory duty for health care assistants
to have any training. Invariably, such
training is considered to be the respon-
sibility of their employing organisation
and this has led to informal and non-
standardised training programmes.
While national vocational qualifications
(NVQs) were introduced in the UK in an
attempt to standardise the training of
health care assistants, their introduction
has not been widespread. This means
that their role often varies depending
upon the country and the clinical area in
which the person is employed. This lack
of standardisation of their role is a
potential threat to safety and quality.
Attempts have been made to develop
skills, experience, and career ladders for
health care assistants. While such recog-
nition is laudable, it is still the case that
many remain unlicensed and unregu-
lated. There is no system in place
whereby a health care assistant’s crim-
inal record or level of competence can be
checked. There have been some well
publicised cases where patients have
been subjected to abuse at the hands
of health care assistants who were
dismissed from their work and started
employment in another setting shortly
afterwards. Unlike most health profes-
sionals, there are no mechanisms in
place to alert the new employer to past
offences. There have also been reports
that some nurses were removed from
the nursing register and began working
as health care assistants, particularly in
the nursing home sector.
There are proposals for extending
regulation to those staff who have a
direct impact on patients. Meanwhile,
within this climate of regulation uncer-
tainty, many nurses depend vicariously
on health care assistants to deliver
unsupervised direct patient care without
being certain of the safety or quality of
such care. According to their Code of
Professional Conduct, nurses should not
delegate duties to health care assistants
if they are concerned that the care
undertaken will not be up to the
standard expected by a nurse who
would normally undertake the task.
However, it is impossible to ensure
delegation is appropriate if roles are
not clearly defined and training is ad
hoc. If nurses are under pressure, they
may allow health care assistants to carry
out unsupervised tasks they would not
otherwise consider, which could result
in patients being put at risk.
In a climate of a global shortage of
registered nurses and demands for them
to embrace a ‘‘role drift’’ to medical
duties, there is an increasing reliance on
health care assistants to fill the gaps in
care. The majority of health care assis-
tants are caring and conscientious
individuals who are often pressurised
to go beyond their level of competence
to perform duties for which they are
not qualified—potentially endangering
patients. The health care assistants
themselves are powerless, waiting on
policymakers to sort out the mess while
they do their best in an unenviable
situation.
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Description without prescription is like diagnosis without treatment
W
hy bother trying to discover
how clinicians make decisions?
Would it really make any
difference to the quality of care if we
knew more about their decision making
processes? Is there any basis for the
conventional assumption that it would
make a significant difference, and in the
right direction?
Probably not. During the three dec-
ades since the pioneering work of
Elstein et al,1 numerous studies of the
decision making behaviour of clini-
cians—and, indeed, professionals in
many fields—have yielded only one
relevant finding. Insofar as we can make
inferences about how they decide what
to do by observing their behaviour or
interrogating them, their decisions and
decision processes vary enormously.
Even when researchers are able to come
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up with generalisations about the diag-
nostic or therapeutic processes of practi-
tioners, these are often weakly
supported and/or highly restricted in
their coverage. Above all, they are
analytically vague. This is not surprising
because, even though some explicitly
analytical reasoning is usually reported
by practitioners, the expertise applied in
professional decision making appears to
be substantially intuitive, involving sig-
nificant amounts of either intuitive
pattern recognition or intuitive regres-
sion across ‘‘multiple fallible indica-
tors’’.2 The disappointing results from
the vast amounts of money and effort
put into developing ‘‘expert systems’’ of
the production rule (‘‘if-then’’) sort
have merely confirmed that much of
the time experts literally do not know
what they are doing. This does not, of
course, imply that what they are doing
is not appropriate and may indeed be
optimal. What it does mean is that even
skilled ‘‘knowledge engineers’’ cannot
extract the inaccessible elements of
expertise for use in either practice
guidelines or professional training.
Given the undoubted existence and
significance of intuitive expertise, what
is the point of attempting to describe the
decisional behaviour of doctors? Setting
aside the aim of acquiring knowledge
for its own sake, which justifies the
interest of the academic psychologist,
does descriptive theorising and empiri-
cal research without an explicit pre-
scriptive standard have any practical use
for either practitioner decision making
or professional education? Why spend
any time on descriptive theorising
unless one knows what is the best
decision or best decision process, or
both? Without a prescriptive basis, the
use of descriptive results in improving
the quality of care is zero and this is true
whether the adopted prescriptive basis
is decision analysis, the practice of some
person or some group defined as best
decision practice, or any other criterion.
It is, of course, methodologically
imperative that the prescriptive basis
be defined before any research study.
Otherwise one will simply be defining
the prescriptive as what happens: this is
the way doctors do make decisions,
therefore this is the way they should
make decisions. Alternatively, one will
end up simply pointing out the
existence of variation, in itself of no
practical use except insofar as it acts as a
stimulus to identifying the necessary
prescriptive basis.3
If one does have an accepted pre-
scriptive basis for quality care, why not
just apply it and teach it to the extent
either is possible? Forget the descriptive
challenge except as an aid in determin-
ing the most effective way to identify
the obstacles to implementing the pre-
scriptive.
But there is a major difficulty lurking
here—one that only an explicitly analy-
tical prescriptive standard, such as that
offered by decision analysis, satisfacto-
rily exposes. Many studies of practi-
tioner decision making which seek to
evaluate the quality of decisions (either
explicitly or implicitly) fail to recognise,
or sufficiently emphasise, two things.
Firstly, that there can be no such things
as a gold standard verdict on manage-
ment decisions of the sort that is
possible on diagnostic judgements.
Decisions involve value judgements as
well as probability judgements and the
prescriptive bases of the two types are
very different, if indeed one exists for
value judgements. Secondly, that any
evaluation of a decision by a prescriptive
standard must logically be on an ex ante
basis. One cannot sensibly evaluate a
decision by its ex post outcome, as is
often suggested.
One can certainly set up a prescriptive
standard against which to evaluate an
ex ante probability judgement offered as
to whether this patient has appendicitis
or this child has been abused. But
unless one can also set up a gold
standard on the value side of the
decision, which will involve establishing
the relative value/disutility to be
assigned (ex ante) to the false positive
and false negative errors always possible
under irreducible uncertainty, one can-
not evaluate the decision. In order to
evaluate the decision one must be able
to identify what the best one was in this
particular case, and this necessitates
identifying the best available probabil-
ities and most appropriate value judge-
ments—in both cases at the moment of
decision. Evaluation of decisions is
therefore contingent on agreement on
the values and preferences regarded as
the appropriate ones at that moment,
Ethically, these should be those of the
owner(s) of the decision—the patient in
the private clinical situation or several
constituencies in the public health and
health services. If there is insufficient
agreement on these—and some varia-
tion in values may be consistent with
the same choice of action—no agreed
evaluation of the quality of a decision
will be possible.
Why the ex ante basis? Under uncer-
tainty it is possible that the best decision
will produce the worst outcome and vice
versa. One can obviously establish, by
an ex post gold standard procedure,
whether this patient actually had
appendicitis or whether this child had
actually been abused. (The latter exam-
ple illustrates the difficulty of establish-
ing 24 carat gold standard verdicts or, in
many cases, ones of very few carats.)
But while the judgement/ex post out-
come observation in this case can be
added to the database for future deci-
sions—improving the assessments of
the sensitivity and specificity of the
professional concerned—it cannot, by
definition, change the evidence that was
available at the time the original deci-
sion was made. It is therefore irrelevant
to the evaluation of that decision. (The
existence of a treatment effect, as in
the ventilation case investigated by
Kostopoulou and Wildman,3 is a serious
problem for the development of the
evidential database.) Equally irrelevant
is the experienced utility or disutility of
the actual outcome, as opposed to the
anticipated utility or disutility of the
possible outcomes at the moment of
the decision.
Description without prescription is as
useful as diagnosis without treatment.
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